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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONTRACT CLAUSE-MINNESOTA'S PENSION
PLAN ACT VIOLATES CONTRACT CLAUSE.
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus (U.S. 1978)
Allied Structural Steel Company (Allied) entered into a pension plan
agreement in 1963 with its salaried employees which, under certain condi-
tions, granted employees vested pension rights. 1 A vested interest in the
plan guaranteed an employee the right to receive a monthly pension when
he reached the age of sixty-five, regardless of any subsequent termination of
his employment. 2 An employee under sixty-five years of age could not have
his interest in this pension vest, however, unless he worked for at least
fifteen years. 3
On April 9, 1974, Minnesota enacted the Private Pension Benefits Pro-
tection Act (Pension Act)4 which provided, inter alia, that if an employer
ceased to operate a place of employment in Minnesota, he would owe his
employees a "pension funding charge" for all the years of service over ten
that were not vested under the employer's plan. 5 Later in 1974, Allied
1. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 236 (1978). The specific provi-
sions of the plan with respect to vesting were described by the Allied Structural Steel Court as
follows:
At age 65 an employee was entitled to retire and receive a monthly pension generally
computed by multiplying 1% of his average monthly earnings by the total number of his
years of employment with the company .... An employee could also become entitled to
receive a pension, payable in full at age 65, if he met any one of the following require-
ments: (1) he had worked 15 years for the company and reached the age of 60; or (2) he
was at least 55 years old and the sum of his age and his years of service with the company
was at least 75; or (3) he was less than 55 years old but the sum of his age and his years of
service with the company was at least 80.
Id. at 236-37 (footnotes omitted). Allied was the sole contributor to this pension fund. Id. at
237. Contributions were made annually to the fund based on actuarial predictions of future
payout needs. Id. Although Allied "retained a virtually unrestricted right to amend the plan in
whole or in part" and was free to terminate the plan at will, the contributions already made to
the fund were irrevocably part of the pension fund and could not be withdrawn by the com-
pany. Id. The agreement, however, did not require Allied to make specific contributions nor
did it impose any sanctions on the company for failing to contribute adequately to the fund. Id.
2. Id.
3. See id.; note 1 supra.
4. Private Pension Benefits Protection Act of 1974, H.F. No. 2764, §§ 1-17, 1974 Minn.
Laws ch. 437 (codified at 13A MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1979)).
5. 13A MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181B.04 (West Supp. 1979). The Minnesota statute provided
in pertinent part:
Every employer who hereafter ceases to operate a place of employment . . . within this
state shall owe . . . a pension funding charge which shall be equal to the present value of
the total amount of nonvested pension benefits based upon service occurring before April
10, 1974 of such employees of the employer who have completed ten or more years of
any covered service under the pension plan of the employer and whose nonvested pen-
sion benefits have been or will be forfeited because of the employer's ceasing to operate a
place of employment or a pension plan, less the amount of such nonvested pension ben-
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began to phase out its Minnesota office and Minnesota sought to enforce the
early vesting provisions of the Pension Act. 6 The state claimed that Allied
owed a pension funding charge of approximately $185,000 under the provi-
sions of the Pension Act. 7
Allied brought suit in federal district court seeking injunctive and de-
claratory relief8 contending, inter alia, that the Pension Act unconstitution-
ally impaired Allied's contracts with its employees. 9 A three-judge district
court, applying a test of minimal scrutiny, upheld the validity of the Pension
Act after finding that the Act was reasonably adapted to and necessary for
the accomplishment of a vital state purpose. 10 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed the district court's ruling, holding that
the Pension Act violated the contract clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
6. 438 U.S. at 239. Allied employed thirty workers in its Minnesota office. Id. at 236. On
July 31, 1974, the company discharged 11 of these 30 workers, 9 of whom did not have any
vested pension rights under the company's plan, but who would have acquired a vested interest
under the Pension Act. Id.
7. Id. at 239. The $185,000 equaled the amount of nonvested pension benefits of those
employees who had worked for more than a decade, minus any amount of pension benefits that
Allied had voluntarily paid to these employees. See 13A MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181B.04 (West
Supp. 1979).
Thus, if Allied had employed a woman for fourteen years, who was sixty-four years old
when Allied closed its Minnesota office, she would not have had a vested interest in Allied's
plan. See note 1 supra. Nevertheless, the Pension Act would have required Allied to pay this
employee a pension. See note 5 supra. These payments, however, would have been commensu-
rate with the pension benefits she would have earned for fourteen (not fifteen) years of service.
See 13A MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181B.04 (West Supp. 1979). Consequently, her monthly pension
when she reached sixty-five years of age would have equalled .01 X Average Monthly Salary
X 14. See id.; note I supra.
8. Fleck v. Spannaus, 421 F. Supp. 20, 21 (D. Minn. 1976). The original plaintiffs-Allied,
the trustees of its pension fund, and two Allied employees-initially filed a motion to convene a
three-judge court. Fleck v. Spannaus, 412 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1976). The motion was
granted because the court found a substantial constitutional claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2281
(1976). 412 F. Supp. at 370-71. The three-judge court dismissed the claims of the trustees and
the two employees because they lacked standing, and certified certain novel issues of state law
to the Minnesota Supreme Court. 421 F. Supp. at 21-23. The three-judge panel declined at this
point to consider the constitutional questions which Allied had presented because they were not
yet essential to the court's disposal of the case. Id. at 22. The Minnesota Supreme Court found
that the Pension Act was applicable to Allied's Minnesota office personnel. Fleck v. Spannaus,
- Minn. - ... 251 N.W.2d 334, 340 (1977). The case was again considered by the
three-judge federal court which ruled on the constitutional questions that it had declined to
address in its first opinion. Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644 (1977), rev'd sub nom. Allied
Structural Steel v, Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). For the lower court's treatment of the con-
stitutional issues, see note 10 infra.
9. 412 F. Supp. at 371. In addition to arguing that the Pension Act violated the contract
clause, Allied argued that it violated the commerce, due process, and equal protection clauses
of the United States Constitution. Id. Allied also argued that the Pension Act was preempted by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976), and
that the Pension Act itself was intended by the Minnesota legislature to become void when the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 came into effect. 412 F. Supp. at 368-71.
The contracts which Allied alleged were impaired by the Pension Act were: 1) the
employment agreements entered into by Allied and its employees; and 2) the trust agreement
between the trustee of the pension fund and the company. 449 F. Supp. at 649 n.5.
10. Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644, 649-50 (D. Minn. 1977). The three-judge court in
Fleck examined the Pension Act in light of the United States Supreme Court's then most recent
1979-19801
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While the contract clause forbids the states from passing any "Law im-
pairing the Obligation of Contracts," 11 the documentary history of that
clause suggests that the convention delegates viewed the measure as primar-
ily a prohibition on the states from legislatively abrogating existing private
debts between citizens. 12 Early in the nineteenth century, however, the
analysis of the contract clause in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). See
449 F. Supp. at 646. For a discussion of United States Trust, see notes 34-40 and accompanying
text infra. The Fleck court found that United States Trust drew "an important distinction be-
tween general regulatory legislation impairing a range of private contracts and legislation ab-
rogating a particular contract to which the state was a party." Id. at 646-47. Where the state was
a party to the particular contract it sought to impair, the Fleck court concluded that the tradi-
tional judicial stance of complete deference to legislative judgment concerning matters of
economic and social regulation would be inappropriate. Id. Where, however, the state was not a
party to the contract, the court maintained that the more relaxed deferential standard of review
should be employed. Id.
In applying this deferential standard of review, the Fleck court first noted that the Pension
Act did not significantly alter the contracting parties' expectations. Id. at 649. The court
reasoned that although the Pension Act altered the length of employment necessary for an
employee to gain a vested interest in the pension fund, it did not significantly alter the likeli-
hood that Allied would have to make those payments because Allied never anticipated plant
closures when it established the fund and, therefore, should have anticipated paying benefits to
the workers covered under the Act in, at most, five years, Id. at 648.
Turning to the state's interest in regulating pensions, the Fleck court maintained that since
the loss of a pension fund would have both present and future implications for the employees
themselves and for their community, the state had a vital public interest to protect. Id. at
650-51. Finding that the Pension Act was reasonably adapted to and necessary for the protection
of this interest, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Act. Id. at 651.
11. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. The contract clause is included with a number of other prohi-
bitions placed on the states by § 10, which provides in pertinent part:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law,
or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
Id. (emphasis added).
12. On August 28, 1787, Rufus King of Massachusetts "moved to add, in the words used in
the Ordinance of Congress establishing new States, a prohibition on the States to interfere with
private contracts." J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 542 (Ohio University Press ed. 1966). King's reference was to the recently drafted Northwest
Ordinance which contained the following clause: "And in just preservation of rights and prop-
erty, it is understood and declared that no law ought ever to be made or have force in that
territory that shall in any manner interfere with or affect private contracts or any agreements,
bona fide and without fraud, previously formed." C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CON-
STITUTION 554 (1937). Although the brief debate following King's introduction of this proposed
clause indicates that some members thought this measure was "carrying the restraint too far,"
the measure was nonetheless approved in principle. J. MADISON, supra, at 542-43.
On September 12, 1787, the Committee of Style reported to the Convention its version of
Mr. King's proposal as follows: "No State shall ...pass any bill of attainder, nor ex post facto
laws, nor laws altering or impairing the obligations of contracts .... " Id. at 616, 621 (emphasis
added). Two days later, however, this clause mysteriously appeared in an altered form so as to
read: "No State shall ... pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts ...." Id. at 641-42 (emphasis added). Unlike other minor alterations
made in the wording of proposed constitutional provisions, the deletion of the reference to
"altering" contracts inspired no debate, nor did it provoke any further comment. See id. at
634-42.
The discussion of the contract clause by the Federalists during the campaign for the Con-
stitution's ratification offers no insight into the reasons for the Convention's modification of
Rufus King's original proposal. Hamilton spoke of the clause as a necessary restraint to achieve
[VOL. 25: p. 160
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Supreme Court gave the contract clause a more expansive reading by hold-
ing that it applied to contracts to which the state is a party, as well as to
private contracts, 13 and that it limited state regulation of corporate char-
ters, 14 tax exemptions, 15 and public land grants. 16 Despite this liberal in-
terpretation of what types of agreements were included within the constitu-
tional meaning of "contracts," the Court initially refused to give the word
"impairment" such an expansive construction; a mere alteration of a contrac-
tual relationship was not considered to be an "impairment" unless it entailed
a reduction in a contractual obligation. 17 However, early in the twentieth
interstate peace. THE FEDERALISTS No. 7 (A. Hamilton) 65 (New American Library ed. 1961).
Madison, writing collectively about the prohibition against states passing bills of attainder, ex
post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, spoke of them as a necessary
requisite to insuring individual liberty and initiative from the debilitating effects of legislative
meddling. THE FEDERALISTS No. 44 (J. Madison) 282-83 (New American Library ed. 1961).
Although there is no exposition by the Framers as to why they modified Rufus King's
proposal, it is submitted that a fair reading of this change is that it indicates an intent on the
part of the Framers to limit the scope of the clause to prohibit only those laws which would
deny a contractual obligation to an obligee of a contract. This position is supported by an often
quoted speech by Luther Martin, a Convention Delegate, before the Maryland House of Dele-
gates on November 29, 1787:
I considered, Sir, that there might be times of such great public calamities and distress,
and of such extreme scarcity of specie, as should render it the duty of a government, for
the preservation of even the most valuable part of its citizens, in some measure to inter-
fere in their favor, by passing laws totally or partially stopping the courts of justice, or
authorizing the debtor to pay by installments, or by delivering up his property to his
creditors at a reasonable and honest valuation. The times have been such as to render
regulations of this kind necessary in most or all of the States, to prevent the wealthy
creditor and the monied man from totally destroying the poor though even industrious
debtor. Such times may again arrive. I therefore voted against depriving the States of this
power, a power which I am decided they ought to possess, but which, I admit, ought
only to be exercised on very important and urgent occasions.
B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 13 (1938), quoting III M. FAR-
RAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 214-15 (1911) (emphasis in original). See also
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 461 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
13. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 654 (1819) (state's effort
to alter its charter to college violates the contract clause); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87, 139 (1810) (contract clause prohibits state from repealing a statutory land grant). See also W.
HUNTING, THE OBLIGATION OF THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION (1919); B. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 27-61.
14. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 654 (1819).
15. See State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 392 (1853); New Jersey v.
Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, 167 (1812). See also B. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 179-94.
16. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810).
17. See, e.g., Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143 (1883); Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88
(1834); Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829). In Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829), the Court considered the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute
which, in effect, validated a contract that had previously been rendered void by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. Id. at 380. The Satterlee Court, in reaching its decision, stated that "to
create a contract and to destroy or impair one," did not mean the same thing. Id. at 413.
Similarly, in Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 (1834), the Pennsylvania Legislature
had enacted a measure to cure defects in a deed. Id. at 90. The Court, in rejecting the argu-
ment that this act impaired a contractual obligation, stated simply that "it goes to confirm, and
not to impair the contract." Id. at 111.
The Court subsequently developed a test which distinguished between alterations in the
procedure of enforcing a contractual right and an alteration in the contract itself. See Gross v.
United States Mortgage Co., 108 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1883). In Gross, the Court sustained the
1979-19801
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century, when judicial intervention into economic regulation was at its
height, I the Court expanded its interpretation of "impairment" to include
the enlargement of obligations. 19
validity of a retrospective law validating a mortgage of a foreign corporation which was taken by
that corporation at a time when such mortgages were illegal. Id. at 490. Citing Satterlee and
Watson for the proposition that a law which gives validity to a contractual obligation cannot be
said to impair that obligation, the Gross Court seemed to reason that the alteration in an en-
forcement right enlarged, rather than diminished, a contractual obligation. Id. at 488-89. The
Court rejected the argument that such a statute was prohibited by the contract clause since the
statute merely enabled the parties to enforce the contract which they intended to make. Id. at
488.
18. During the period from 1905 to 1936, the Court employed the doctrine of substantive
due process-which tested state legislation by examining whether the law bore a reasonable
relation to a legitimate governmental end-to strike down a considerable number of statutes
regulating social and economic matters. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
550-616 (1975). Thus, if the law was not reasonably designed to accomplish a legitimate end of
government, the Court would strike it down as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Williams v. Standard
Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917). Moreover, the Court
during this period maintained an extremely narrow view as to which legitimate "ends" both the
federal and state legislatures could reach. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525
(1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court struck down a law
which established the maximum hours that a baker could work in a week because the statute
interfered with the "freedom of master and employee to contract." Id. at 64. The Court's
criteria for determining the validity of the New York law was unabashedly vague and subjective:
"We do not believe in the soundness of the state's views which uphold this law." Id. at 61.
During the thirty years following Lochner, the Court invalidated several laws regula-
ting economic activity because they conflicted with some broad constitutional dictate. See, e.g.,
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (due process prohibits minimum
wage law for women workers); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (due process
prohibits setting maximum legal price for sale of gasoline); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261
U.S. 525 (1923) (due process prohibits minimum wage for women workers); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (tenth amendment precludes Congress from prohibiting, under
its commerce clause powers, the use of child labor in mines and factories that are functioning
exclusively within a state's borders); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (due process pro-
hibits states from banning "yellow-dog" contracts); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)
(due process prohibits Congress from outlawing "yellow-dog" contracts).
The Court's strict examination of the appropriateness of the means and ends of laws affect-
ing economic or social interests became widely discredited in the years that followed Morehead.
After that decision, the Court began to adopt the position which Justice Holmes had espoused
in his dissent in Lochner. See 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting); note 70 infra. Justice
Holmes believed that Lochner had been "decided upon an economic theory," and not upon the
Constitution which he maintained did not "embody a particular economic theory." 198 U.S. at
75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. See Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U.S. 432 (1923). In Georgia Railway, a
rail and power company and a town had previously agreed to limit the fare between Decatur
and Atlanta to five cents. Id. at 434. A state statute then extended the limits of this town, and a
state court held that the five cent fare was applicable to the entire area within the town's new
boundaries. Id. at 439. The United States Supreme Court held that
[w]hile the statute does not refer to the contract or in terms make the rates applicable in
the annexed territory, the necessary result of the decision of the state courts is to give it
that effect, and in that way the statute, in the respect complained of, does substantially
impair the obligation of the contract by adding to its burdens.
Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
The Georgia Railway Court did not expressly overrule Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 380 (1829). For a discussion of Satterlee, see note 17 supra. Since the Georgia Railway
decision was made "during the heyday of substantive due process," it was argued by the dissent
in Allied Structural Steel that the decision should no longer be controlling. See 438 U.S. at 259
n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting); note 59 and accompanying text infra. Indeed, the Georgia Rail-
[VOL. 25: p. 160
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The expanding protection of contractual obligations from state interfer-
ence has often been perceived to conflict with the police power of the
state. 20 In West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 21 the Court held that the con-
tract clause did not insulate the property rights bestowed in a public charter
from the state's power to exercise eminent domain over that property.
2 2
Declaring that all contracts were made subject to the state's right of eminent
domain, the Court concluded that a contract could not be impaired by the
mere exercise of that right. 23
The state's power to regulate existing debtor obligations was sustained
against a contract clause attack in the landmark case of Home Building &
Loan Association v. Blaisdell. 24 In Blaisdell, the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium Law, which temporarily extended the redemption period for
existing mortgages, was sustained by the Court even though it was found to
impair a contractual obligation. 25 The Court, in reaching its decision,
way Court's expansive view of "impairment" seemed to have been rejected in Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). The Blaisdell Court stated that "[tihe obligations of
a contract are impaired by a law which renders them invalid or releases or extinguishes them."
Id. at 431 (emphasis added) (citation and footnote omitted). For a discussion of Blaisdell, see
notes 24-27 and accompanying text infra. See also Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract
Clause, 57 HA.Rv. L. REv. 512, 512-13 (1944).
20. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47
U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). See also notes 21-23 and accompanying text infra.
21. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). In West River Bridge, the Vermont legislature created a
corporation with the exclusive privilege of erecting a bridge over the West River. Id. at 530.
This franchise was to have lasted from 1795 to 1895. Id. Vermont, however, passed enabling
legislation in 1839 to permit certain state courts to "take any real estate, easement, or franchise
of any turnpike or corporation" and to employ the same methods of compensating the owners of
such property as were used when other properties were taken by the state. Id. The state
subsequently sought to condemn the West River Bridge to incorporate it as part of a public
highway. Id. at 531.
22. 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 531-36. The Court in West River Bridge noted:
No State, it is declared, shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts; yet, with
this concession constantly yielded, it cannot be justly disputed, that in every political
sovereign community there inheres necessarily the right and the duty of guarding its own
existence, and of protecting and promoting the interests and welfare of the community at
large .... This power, denominated the eminent domain of the State, is, as its name
imports, paramount to all private rights vested under the government.
Id. at 531-32 (italics in original). See also B. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 195-202.
23. 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 531-33. See also Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879). In Stone,
the Court upheld Mississippi's right to outlaw the sale of lottery tickets in the state, even
though, one year earlier, the state had granted for consideration a 25-year charter to a lottery
company. Id. at 817, 821. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Waite stated that "the power of
governing is a trust committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be
granted away." Id. at 820. See also B. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 203-13.
24. 290 U.S. 398 (1934), noted in 19 MINN. L. REV. 210 (1935); 8 S. CAL. L. REV. 30
(1934).
25. 290 U.S. at 415-20. See The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law of 1933, H.F. No.
1695, 1933 Minn. Laws 514. The Law, after declaring a public economic emergency, provided,
inter alia, a procedure whereby mortgagees in danger of suffering foreclosure could petition the
state district courts to postpone the foreclosure sale, or, where a sale had already occurred, the
court could order a resale if it thought the first sale was unfair, unreasonable, or otherwise
unjust. See Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law of 1933, H.F. No. 1695, pt. 1, §§ 1-11, 1933
Minn. Laws 514-20; pt. 2, §§ 1-9, 1933 Minn. Laws 520-22.
1979-1980]
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placed heavy emphasis on the economic emergency of the Depression,
which caused Minnesota to enact the Law, and on the Law's temporary na-
ture. 26 However, the Court also acknowledged a need for greater judicial
deference to the legislature in areas affecting the public welfare. 27
The decisions immediately following Blaisdell considered the existence
of the economic crisis to be crucial to the Blaisdell Court's holding. 2 Later
decisions, however, placed greater weight on judicial deference to legislative
determinations of policy in sustaining state laws against contract clause chal-
lenges. 29 For instance, in East New York Savings v. Hahn, 30 the Court
ignored the once crucial emergency factor, and applied a test of judicial
deference which placed primary responsibility for determining the need for
laws which impair contracts on the democratic process. 31 Similarly, in City
of El Paso v. Simmons, 32 the Court permitted Texas to reduce, by statute,
the time within which a defaulted land claim could be reinstated, even
though Texas had previously entered into a contract which established a
greater time period.3 3  The Court, recognizing the state's valid purpose of re-
26. 290 U.S. at 444-48. After an extensive review of the history of the contract clause, the
Blaisdell Court concluded that "the reservation of the reasonable exercise of the protective
power of the State is read into all contracts." Id. at 429-44 (emphasis added). The Blaisdell
Court noted five factors in the Minnesota Act which led it to conclude that the law was a
reasonable exercise of the state's protective power: 1) the existence of an economic emergency,
id. at 444; 2) the legislation was addressed to a legitimate end since it was for the protection of a
general societal interest, id. at 445; 3) the relief afforded was tailored to the emergency at hand,
id.; 4) the conditions upon which the period of redemption was to be extended were reasonable,
id. at 445-47; and 5) the legislation was temporary in operation, id. at 447.
27. Id. at 447-48. The Court stated: "Whether the legislation is wise or unwise as a matter
of policy is a question with which we are not concerned." Id.
28. Under this reading of Blaisdell, the Supreme Court unanimously held that three state
statutes violated the contract clause. See Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936)
(law substantially altered the rights of building and loan association members to withdraw
funds); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935) (law diminished foreclosure rem-
edies of negotiable bonds); and W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (law
exempted life and medical insurance proceeds from collection by the beneficiary's judgment
creditors).
29. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text infra.
30. 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
31. Id. at 234. In East New York Savings, the petitioner challenged a 1933 mortgage
moratorium statute which the New York legislature had, on an annual basis, extended for over a
decade. Id. at 233-35. Ignoring the disappearance of the economic emergency which had led
the legislature to enact the statute, the Court stated: "Merely to enumerate the elements that
have to be considered shows that the place for determining their weight and their significance is
the legislature and not the judiciary." Id. at 234.
32. 379 U.S. 492 (1965).
33. Id. at 516-17. Texas had sold some of its large landholdings in 1910 by contracts under
terms very favorable to the purchaser in order to encourage the development of its vast uninhab-
ited lands. Id. at 500, 510. Only a small down payment with annual payments of interest and
principal were required, and, in the event of forfeiture, the purchaser or his vendee could
reinstate his claim simply by payment of the accrued interest. Id. at 498. The only time limita-
tion on the right to reinstate one's claim was that the interests of third parties could not yet
have intervened. Id. at 498-99. In 1941, however, the Texas legislature enacted a law to limit
this right to reinstatement to five years after default. Id.
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storing confidence and order in its land title system, 34 declared that courts
"must respect the 'wide discretion on the part of the legislature for deter-
mining what is and what is not necessary' " to further the state's purpose.3
This trend toward complete judicial deference to legislatures in deter-
mining the need for statutes in contract clause cases was halted in 1977 in
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey. 36 The United States Trust Court
was faced with the issue of whether New Jersey and New York could con-
stitutionally repeal a contract between themselves and their Port Authority
bondholders which limited the states' use of the funds securing Port Author-
ity bonds. 37 In determining this issue, the Court developed a test under
which a law that impaired a contract would be upheld if the law was both
reasonable and necessary to serve an important state purpose. 38 The Court
found that under this test the states' repeal of the covenant violated the
contract clause. 39 In reaching this decision, the Court implied that while
this stricter standard of scrutiny would be employed in cases involving state
legislative efforts to renege on public contractual obligations, a more relaxed
test would be used in cases involving state impairments of private con-
tracts. 40 A vigorous dissent in United States Trust protested the Court's
The plaintiff in El Paso, Simmons, had purchased the contract rights to land which his
predecessors in title had forfeited because of delinquent interest payments. Id. at 500-01. Five
years and two days after the forfeiture, Simmons paid the back installments. Id. at 518 (Black,
J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Texas refused to reinstate Simmons and sold the land to the City
of El Paso. Id. at 501.
34. Id. at 511-13.
35. Id. at 508-09, quoting East New York Savings v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33 (1945).
Justice Black vigorously dissented in El Paso, protesting the Court's "balancing away" the con-
tract clause protections so that a wealthy state could take a man's property without just compen-
sation. Id. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black interpreted Texas' action as a legislative
attempt to get out of a bargain in which the state did not fare well. Id. at 519-20 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
36. 431 U.S. 1 (1977), noted in 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 1000 (1977).
37. 431 U.S. at 3-14. The 1962 covenant between the Port Authority and its bondholders
basically prohibited the states and their Port Authority from applying any reserve funds for
railroad purposes if such funds were pledged as security for bonds that were outstanding and
unpaid. Id. at 9-10. During the 1973 oil crisis, the two states wanted to use the funds securing
the Port Authority bonds to finance much-needed, mass transit improvements and, thus, they
passed a statute which retroactively repealed the 1962 covenant. Id. at 13-14.
38. Id. at 29. The Court found that the retroactive repeal was not necessary because 1) a
less drastic modification of the 1962 covenant could have accomplished similar objectives; and 2)
alternative means were available for raising funds to improve mass transit. Id. at 29-30. The
repeal was also found to be unreasonable since the Port Authority was aware in 1962 that it
might need funds in the future to support mass transit. Id at 31-32.
39. Id. at 32.
40. Concerning the impairments of private contracts, the United States Trust Court stated:
Legislation adjusting the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties must be upon
reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its
adoption . . . .As is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation, however,
courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to necessity and reasonableness of a par-
ticular measure.
Id. at 22-23 (citations and footnote omitted). The Court noted, however, that this more relaxed
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interpretation of the contract clause. 41  The dissent maintained that the
Court's opinion would impair a state legislature's ability to determine impor-
tant economic and social policy questions by binding one state legislature to
the actions of a prior legislature. 42
Against this historical background, the Allied Structural Steel Court 43
began its analysis by pointing out that although the contract clause is not
"the Draconian provision that its words might seem to imply,"44 neverthe-
less it must be read to "impose some limits upon the power of a State to
abridge existing contractual relationships," even if the state is pursuing a
policy in an area of vital state interest. 45 These limits were found by the
Court to be "clearly indicated" by several of its prior decisions which arose
out of the Great Depression. 46
The Contract Clause is not an absolute bar to subsequent modification of a State's own
financial obligations. As with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, an im-
pairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important
public purpose. In applying this standard, however, complete deference to a legislative
assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-
interest is at stake.
Id. at 25-26 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Indeed, the district court in Allied Structural
Steel interpreted United States Trust as requiring a more relaxed level of scrutiny in cases
involving the impairment of private contracts. See 449 F. Supp. at 646-47; note 10 supra. See
also J. NOVACK, R. ROTUNDA & I. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 428 (1978).
41. 431 U.S. at 33 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion in
which Justices White and Marshall joined. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Justice Brennan, in commenting on the debilitating effect of the United States Trust
decision, wrote:
One of the fundamental premises of our popular democracy is that each generation of
representatives can and will remain responsive to the needs and desires of those whom
they represent. Crucial to this end is the assurance that new legislators will not automati-
cally be bound by the policies and undertakings of earlier days. In accordance with this
philosophy, the Framers of our Constitution conceived of the Contract Clause primarily as
protection for economic transactions entered into by purely private parties, rather than
obligations involving the State itself. The Framers fully recognized that nothing would so
jeopardize the legitimacy of a system of government that relies upon the ebbs and flows of
politics to "clean out the rascals" than the possibility that those same rascals might per-
petuate their policies simply by locking them into binding contracts.
Id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Justice Brennan also disputed the Court's conclusion that the law was not a necessary and
reasonable measure designed to further the admittedly important state purpose. Id. at 34. The
repeal of the 1962 amendment was reasonable, according to the dissent, because the bistate
mass transit plans were well thought out, urgently needed, and apparently a nonpartisan effort.
Id. at 37-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, relying on the findings of the state
legislatures, also found the law to be necessary since the transit plan would not be economically
feasible unless the 1962 covenant was repealed. Id. at 37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. 438 U.S. at 235. Justice Blackmun took no part
in the consideration or decision of this case. Id.
44. Id. at 240. The Court noted that "literalism in the construction of the contract clause
... would make it destructive of the public interest by depriving the State of its prerogative of
self-protection." Id., quoting W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934).
45. 438 U.S. at 242 (emphasis in original).
46. Id. The Court indicated that a state statute would be violative of the contract clause if it
lacked the five characteristics which the Blaisdell Court had considered to be significant. Id. at
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The Court maintained that, in a contract clause analysis, its first inquiry
is whether a substantial impairment 47 of a contractual relationship is caused
by the state law. 48 Then, to determine the degree of scrutiny that should
be given to the statute, the severity of the impairment must be mea-
sured. 49 According to the Court, the severity of the impairment is "mea-
sured by the factors that reflect the high value the Framers placed on the
protection of private contracts," including the ability of contracting parties to
rely with confidence on their contracts so as to arrange with certainty their
future personal and financial affairs. 50 Finally, if a severe impairment is
found, the Court will carefully examine the nature and purpose of the law to
determine its constitutionality. 51
Turning to the facts at bar, the Court found that the Minnesota Pension
Act severely impaired Allied's pension contracts because it altered a contrac-
tual relationship where certainty is vital. 52 Having found a severe impair-
ment, the Court looked to the state's purpose in enacting the statute and
found that, unlike the situation in Blaisdell, the Pension Act was not enacted
to deal with a broad and desperate emergency. 53 Since neither the legisla-
tive findings nor the record before the Court indicated an important social
242-44. For the factors that influenced the Blaisdell Court, see note 26 supra. In addition, the
Allied Structural Steel Court maintained that a sixth factor in deciding to uphold a state law
against a contract clause challenge would be whether "the petitioner had 'purchased into an
enterprise already regulated in the particular to which he now objects.' " 438 U.S. at 242-43
n.13, quoting Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940).
47. 438 U.S. at 244. The Court summarily rejected the dissent's contention that an act
which merely increases contractual obligations is not an "impairment" within the meaning of the
contract clause. Id. at 244 n.16. For the dissent's position, see note 61 infra. The Court stated:
The novel construction of the Contract Clause expressed in the dissenting opinion is
wholly contrary to the decisions of this Court. The narrow view that the Clause forbids
only state laws that diminish the duties of a contractual obligor and not laws that increase
them, a view arguably suggested by Satterlee v. Matthewson, ... has since been ex-
pressly repudiated.
Id. (citations omitted). For a critique of the majority's position, see notes 90-97 and accompany-
ing text infra.
48. 438 U.S. at 244.
49. Id. at 245. Concerning its review of statutes that impair contractual obligations, the
Court stated: "Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first stage.
Severe impairment, on the other hand, will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the
nature and purpose of the state legislation." Id. (footnote omitted).
50. Id. It should be noted that the Court did not mention any other factors which it found
to reflect the Framers' high esteem for contractual rights. See id.
51. Id. See note 48 supra.
52. Id. at 246. The Court found that certainty was vital in this pension agreement because
Allied relied upon the vesting provisions of the agreement when calculating its payments to the
pension fund. Id.
53. Id. at 249. The Court noted, however, that its reliance upon the Blaisdell economic
emergency factor was "not to suggest that only an emergency of great magnitude can constitu-
tionally justify a state law impairing the obligations of contracts." Id. n.24, citing City of El Paso
v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945);
Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
In further considering the purpose of the Pension Act, the Court expressed concern over
the ephemeral nature of the statute, stating that "not only did the Act have an extremely
narrow aim, but its effective life was extremely short." 438 U.S. at 248 n.21. It is interesting to
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problem which necessitated this severe impairment, 54 the Court found that
the "presumption favoring 'legislative judgment as to the necessity and
reasonableness of a particular measure,' " should not stand in this case. 55
The Court also expressed concern over the Pension Act's invasion into an
area never before subject to state regulation because this further upset the
employer's expectations concerning his contractual obligations. 56 Finally,
the Pension Act, unlike related federal legislation, became fully effective the
day after its passage and, thus, failed to provide the affected parties with a
period in which to adjust to the new law. 57
Although, in concluding its opinion, the Court listed many factors which
it considered to be important in deciding Allied Structural Steel, 58 its opin-
ion did not indicate whether one factor, or a combination of factors, would
be decisive in its review of future contract clause cases. Rather, it simply
concluded "that if the Contract Clause means anything at all, it means that
Minnesota could not constitutionally do what it tried to do to the company
in this case." 59
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, 60 maintained that the contract
clause was not relevant to the instant case since the state sought only to
note, however, that a limited effective life was one of the five factors which the Blaisdell Court
found, and which the Allied Structural Steel Court cited with approval, as justifying a state law
that impairs the obligation of contracts. See notes 26 & 46 supra. For a criticism of the Court's
objections to the temporary nature of the Act, see note 82 infra.
54. 438 U.S. at 247. The Court found that the only indication of legislative intent in the
record was the following statement in the district court opinion: "It seems clear that the prob-
lem of plant closure and pension plan termination was brought to the attention of the Minnesota
legislature when the Minneapolis-Moline Division of White Motor Corporation closed one of its
Minnesota plants and attempted to terminate its pension plan." Id. at 247-48, citing Fleck v.
Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. at 651. The Court also concluded that the Minnesota Supreme Court
had "engaged in mere speculation as to the legislature's purpose." 438 U.S. at 248 n.19 (em-
phasis added). For a criticism of the Court's evaluation of the Pension Act's purpose, see notes
75-80 and accompanying text infra.
55. 438 U.S. at 247, quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977).
56. 438 U.S. at 249-50.
57. Id. at 249 & n.23. The Court noted that the comparable federal statute, the Employ-
ment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976), did not go into effect
until four months after it was enacted. See 438 U.S. at 249 n.23; 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976). The
Court also observed that the vesting provisions of the federal statute were held in abeyance for
an additional year. See 438 U.S. at 249 n.23; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1086(b), 1061(b)(2) (1976). Cf. Fleck
v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. at 651 (grace period would defeat purpose of the Pension Act). For a
discussion of the three-judge court's opinion in Fleck, see note 10 supra.
58. See 438 U.S. at 250. After comparing the Pension Act with the other state laws that
survived scrutiny under the contract clause, the Court noted four characteristics in the earlier
laws that were lacking in the Pension Act: 1) the Pension Act did not deal with a broad,
generalized economic or social problem; 2) it did not operate in an area already subject to state
.regulation; 3) the Act did not merely cause a temporary alteration of contractual relationships
but, rather, it created a permanent change in those relationships that was retroactive and ir-
revocable; and 4) it had a narrow aim directed only at those employers "who had in the past
been sufficiently enlightened as voluntarily to agree to establish pension plans for their
employees." Id. For a critique of these factors, see note 68 infra.
59. 438 U.S. at 250-51.
60. Id. at 251 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices White and Marshall joined Justice Brennan
in his dissent. Id.
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impose additional obligations on one contracting party, as opposed to di-
minishing or nullifying existing contractual duties. 61 According to the dis-
sent, the Pension Act should have been reviewed under the due process
clause, 62 in which case the Act would have withstood constitutional
scrutiny. 63 The dissent criticized the Court for subjecting the Pension Act
to the "most exacting scrutiny" when laws which interfere with settled ex-
pectations created by state property law are uniformly subjected to minimal
scrutiny by the Court. 64 Moreover, the dissent predicted that the instant
decision will leave the validity of other laws involving social legislation vul-
nerable to the subjective views of individual judges. 65
It is submitted that the dissent's criticism of the Court's failure to estab-
lish a precise analytical framework for considering challenges based on the
contract clause was justified. 66 While the Court suggested that a state act
which severely impairs the obligations of contracts could be saved if its pur-
61. Id. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of laws that enlarge (as opposed to di-
minish) contractual obligations, see note 19 and accompanying text supra. The dissent followed
Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829), and would therefore limit the reach of the
contract clause to only those cases where a promisee to a contract is denied his rights thereun-
der. 438 U.S. at 258. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
Historically, it is crystal clear that the Contract Clause was not intended to embody a
broad constitutional policy of protecting all reliance interests grounded in private con-
tracts. It was made part of the Constitution to remedy a particular social evil-the state
legislative practice of enacting laws to relieve individuals of their obligations under certain
contracts-and thus was intended to prohibit States from adopting "as [their] policy the
repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce
them .... "
438 U.S. at 256 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 439 (1934) (bracketed material supplied by Brennan, J.). But see 438 U.S. at 244
n.16.
62. 438 U.S. at 251 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 264 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The purpose of the Pension Act, according to Jus-
tice Brennan, was cognizable from both the terms of the Act and the opinion of the lower state
court. Id. at 252-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. note 54 supra. The dissent found that the
measure was designed to combat the serious problem that arises when a worker's expectation of
a pension income is unexpectedly frustrated by the loss of his job due to a plant shutdown. Id.
at 252-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Using a test of reasonableness, the dissent would have
upheld the legislature's decision to protect, from an unforeseen plant closing, the expectation
interests of employees with more than 10 years of service whose pension interests had not yet
vested. Id. at 264 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 261 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan strongly criticized the majority for
upsetting the general approach of upholding the validity of state laws which interfere with
property interests so long as the law is "reasonably related to the promotion of the general
welfare." Id. The dissent contended that providing intense scrutiny under the contract clause,
but not under the other constitutional provisions used to protect economic expectations, pro-
duced "results difficult to square with any rational conception of a constitutional order" since
there is "nothing sacrosanct about expectations rooted in contract that justify according them a
constitutional immunity denied other property rights." Id. at 260-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 261 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that the majority's decision
could only be explained on the grounds that "it subjectively values the interests of employers in
pension plans more highly than it does the legitimate expectation interests of employees." Id. at
261 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 260-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting); note 65 and accompanying text supra.
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pose and need are sufficient to outweigh the need for protecting contractual
expectations, 67 it failed to state which purposes and what degree of need
must be shown before the statute will survive the Court's scrutiny. 68 While
imprecision is not novel in constitutional adjudication, 69 it is submitted that
clarity is essential when constitutional doctrines are used by the Court to
settle disputes involving broad competing economic interests because of the
danger that the Court will decide such cases, not on the basis of neutral
legal principles, but rather, on favored economic theories. 70 Thus, it is
suggested that Justice Brennan correctly criticized the criteria employed by
67. 438 U.S. at 245. See notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra.
68. The Court found that the Pension Act failed because it did not possess the same "attri-
butes of those state laws that in the past have survived challenge under the Contract Clause of
the Constitution." 438 U.S. at 250. See note 58 supra. The attributes mentioned by the Court,
however, were not all present in the statutes which the Court had previously upheld as valid.
For instance, the Court concluded that prior statutes found to be constitutional under the con-
tract clause, such as the one in Blaisdell, dealt with broad economic or social problems. 438
U.S. at 250. In fact, however, some of the statutes upheld in other contract clause cases dealt
with much narrower problems. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965)
(statute limited the time within which a defaulted public land claim could be reinstated); Day-
Bright Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (law permitted employees to take time off
from work without loss of pay on election day). Also, the Allied Structural Steel Court found
that the Pension Act permanently altered contractual relations, whereas the earlier statutes
merely caused temporary alterations. 438 U.S. at 250. This conclusion ignores the statutes of
both El Paso, see notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra, and East New York Savings v.
Hahn, 326 U.S. 492 (1965) (where the very issue presented before the Court was whether New
York could continue a mortgage moratorium act, even though 10 years had passed since the
time of the crisis which had necessitated the act's original passage). See notes 30-31 and accom-
panying text supra. Moreover, as the Court concedes, there was no substantial emergency to
justify sustaining the statutes in three of the prior contract clause cases. See 438 U.S. at 249
n.24; notes 53 & 58 supra. Thus, it is difficult to predict what a state must prove to convince
the Court that the statute is reasonable, and that the state's need and purpose are adequate to
justify the contractual impairment.
69. See, e.g., Comment, Federalism and a New Equal Protection, 24 VILL. L. 11EV. 557
(1979) (concluding that equal protection law is in a state of confusion).
70. It is further submitted that clarity is compelling in this situation because in a contract
clause case the Court is reviewing the validity of measures which are central to the legislative
function-i.e., the regulation of commerce. If a reviewing court is able to strike down such
measures, not because they conflict with a precisely stated rule of law, but because the court
determines that the legislature employed "inappropriate" means or pursued an "unnecessary"
end, the court is essentially acting as a "super-legislature," substituting its judgment for that of
the legislators who represent the majority of citizens.
The mere fact that the reviewing court invokes an explicit constitutional provision, it is
submitted, does not, in itself, mean that it is applying a specific rule of law since the language
of the Constitution is too broad and vague for its exact application to be self-evident. The
precise meaning of a constitutional dictate, therefore, depends on the vast interstitial develop-
ments in judicial decisions. See, e.g., 438 U.S. at 240 (although language of contract clause is
unambiguously absolute, the Court does not interpret it literally); W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (contract clause should not be interpreted literally). But cf. City of
El Paso v. Simmons, 379 US. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting) (asserting that constitutional lan-
guage should be given its literal meaning).
Because of the broad language of the Constitution, the Court in the last forty years has
been reticent in scrutinizing legislative acts which regulate social or economic matters. See
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). In Day-Brite Lighting a contract
clause challenge was raised against a statute that permitted all employees to leave their job for
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the Court to determine the validity of the state law as so malleable and
vague as to render such cases vulnerable to the economic views of
judges. 71 The influences of such subjectivity, it is submitted, are ironically
demonstrated in Allied Structural Steel by the Court's selective application
of facts and precedent to support its position favoring Allied's interests over
the interests of Allied's employees. 72
It is suggested that the majority's selectivity in its analysis of the facts
first surfaced when it considered the effects of the Pension Act. While em-
phasizing the Pension Act's blow to Allied's expectations in managing its
pension fund, it is submitted that the Court failed to consider adequately the
hardship that a sudden plant closing, coupled with the complete loss of over
a decade's accumulated pension credits, would have on employee expecta-
tions. 73 Although the Court recognized that the "element of reliance could
cut both ways," the Court refused to consider the plight of the Minnesota
workers because it could find no indication in the record that the purpose of
the Pension Act was to protect the employees' reliance interests. 74
It is further suggested that the Court's selective factual analysis con-
tinued when it considered the purpose of the Pension Act. The only indica-
tion of legislative intent found by the majority was the statement by the
district court that the "problem of plant closure and pension plan termina-
tion was brought to the attention of the Minnesota legislature when [a major
employer] closed one of its Minnesota plants and attempted to terminate its
pension plan." 75 The Court therefore inferred that the Pension Act clearly
possessed an extremely narrow focus. 76 It is submitted, however, that
legislative purpose cannot be fairly inferred by simply examining the social
crisis that brought the problem of frustrated worker expectations before the
four hours on election days without loss of pay. Id. at 422-23. In upholding the statute, the
Court stated: "[T]he state legislatures have constitutional authority to experiment with new
techniques; .. .they may within extremely broad limits control practices in the business-labor
field .... Id. at 423. See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (Court sustained
Kansas law prohibiting the business of debt adjusting to all but lawyers); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (sustaining Oklahoma law which prohibited the fitting and
duplicating of lenses except by a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist); Lincoln Fed. Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (upholding Nebraska and North
Carolina right-to-work laws); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941) (sustaining Nebraska
law which set maximum fees chargeable by employment agencies because the "wisdom, need,
and appropriateness of this legislation was for the state legislature to determine").
71. See 438 U.S. 261 & n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting); note 65 and accompanying text supra.
72. See note 65 supra.
73. See 438 U.S. at 246-47.
74. Id. at 246 n. 18. But cf. Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644, 649-50 (D. Minn. 1977)
(district court found that the act was designed to protect employee accumulated pension credits
from unanticipated loss); Fleck v. Spannaus, - Minn. . -, 251 N.W.2d 334, 338-39
(1977) (Minnesota Supreme Court opinion considered the protection of employee expectations
to be an important purpose of the act). See also Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When
Plants Shut Down: Problems and Some Proposals, 76 HARV. L. REv. 952 (1963).
75. 438 U.S. at 247-48, quoting 449 F. Supp. at 651.
76. 438 U.S. at 248.
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Minnesota legislature. 77 Moreover, the district court opinion is not the
only source from which the Court could infer a legislative intent. 78 Min-
nesota's highest court, as the dissent noted, 79 found that the Pension Act
was enacted to regulate several pension abuses including: 1) the use of un-
reasonably long periods of employment as a prerequisite to vesting; 2)
employer concealment of material information from employees as to their
rights under the pension plan; and 3) a lack of adequate pension funding. 80
Furthermore, it is submitted that the majority's construction of the Act's
focus in a light most unfavorable to its validity presents further evidence of
the Court's selective analysis of the facts underlying the controversy before
it. The Court objected to the Act's narrow focus because it applied only to
employers who terminated their pension plans or whose Minnesota opera-
tions had shut down. 81 It is suggested, however, that this narrow focus,
which the majority considered invidious, could with equal logic be viewed as
an attempt to tailor the Pension Act to remedy the specific evil of frustrated
worker expectations that occur when an employer by his own actions termi-
nates a pension plan. 82
The influence of judicial subjectivity was also revealed by the Court's
selective analysis of recent contract clause precedent which the Court consis-
tently interpreted against the constitutionality of the Pension Act. 83 The
Court essentially ignored East New York Savings-a decision in which the
Court deferred evaluation of a statute's purpose and need to the wisdom of
77. Admittedly, problems are often brought to the attention of legislatures after they have
been manifested by a serious crisis. The legislature's response is often to investigate and enact
laws that will prevent future troubles of a related nature. See generally G. GALLOWAY, THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN CONGRESS (1953); H. WALKER, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1948). It
seems, however, to be a gross oversimplification of the legislative process to suggest that in
examining a particular crisis, the legislature is only interested in ameliorating that particular
crisis and not with remedying the underlying causes that led to the creation of the social prob-
lem. The fact that in the present case White Motor's closing of a large Minnesota plant exposed
a flaw in Minnesota's protection of worker pension plans seems only to indicate how the Min-
nesota legislature became aware of an existing social problem, and not necessarily that the limit
of their concern was with that particular problem.
78. The Court ignored the district court's findings that the act was intended to protect the
accumulated pension credits of workers from the unanticipated loss following a plant shut down.
See note 10 supra. The majority also rejected, without explanation, the Minnesota Supreme
Court's findings as "mere speculation as to the state legislature's purpose." 438 U.S. at 248
n.19, citing Fleck v. Spannaus, - Minn. -, 251 N.W.2d 334 (1977).
79. 438 U.S. at 252 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Fleck v. Spannaus, - Minn. ____ 251 N.W.2d 334, 338 (1977).
81. 438 U.S. at 248-50.
82. Cf. 438 U.S. at 261 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("it is the existence of the pension plan
that creates the need for this legislation"). Even more difficult to understand is why the Court
objected to the temporary nature of the Pension Act. Id. at 248 n.21. It would seem that
limiting the length of the Act until Congress had enacted its own pension protection plan
adds credence both to a legitimate need for such protection and to the reasonableness of the
measure enacted by Minnesota, since it did not unnecessarily extend regulation beyond the
period necessary to protect the Minnesota workers.
83. 438 U.S. at 242-45.
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the legislature. 84 It is also submitted that the majority's attempt to distin-
guish El Paso, on the basis that the statute in that case caused only a minor
impairment of contractual obligations, 85 is unconvincing because the statute
there did work a substantial impairment on the state's contractual obliga-
tions. 86 A third case, Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Association, 87
was distinguished on the ground that the savings associations which the stat-
ute in issue affected were already subject to extensive regulatory control,
whereas the pension plan in Allied Structural Steel was not so regulated. 88
It is suggested, however, that this distinction is not persuasive because pen-
sion plans, like financial institutions, are, in fact, subject to legislative regu-
lations. 89
Another major weakness in Allied Structural Steel was, it is submitted,
the Court's inadequate explanation of why it chose to include acts that en-
large the obligations of a contracting party within the contract clause's pro-
hibition against the impairment of contractual obligations. 90 While it is un-
doubtedly true that an act imposing additional obligations on a contracting
party can have a detrimental effect on that party's economic expectations, it
may be inferred from the history of the contract clause that the Framers
rejected language that would encompass such acts in favor of the more lim-
ited prohibition against impairment of obligations. 91 Therefore, it is
84. See 326 U.S. at 234. For a discussion of East New York Savings, see notes 30-31 and
accompanying text supra. The Allied Structural Steel Court, after criticizing the Pension Act for
not dealing with a broad emergency, stated in a footnote that "this is not to suggest that only an
emergency of great magnitude can constitutionally justify a state law impairing the obligation of
contracts." 438 U.S. at 249 n.24 (citations omitted). The Court cited East New York Savings to
support this proposition without noting that the Court, in that case, refused to even consider
whether there was an emergency because that evaluation was a question which the legislature
was exclusively competent to address. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
85. See 438 U.S. at 243-44 n.14.
86. See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. at 516-17; notes 32-35 and accompanying text
supra. Although the El Paso Court noted that the act in that case "was a mild one indeed,
hardly burdensome," it is submitted that the Court was referring to the act's general application
and not to the impact it had on impairing the contract of Mr. Simmons (who, in fact, lost his
property as a result of the statute's application). See 379 U.S. at 516-17. Thus, it is suggested
that the El Paso Court was not referring to the level of impairment suggested by the Allied
Structural Steel Court; rather, when the El Paso Court spoke of the act as "hardly burden-
some," it was referring to the ease of complying with the statute which, in turn, demonstrated
its reasonableness.
87. 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
88. 438 U.S. at 242-43 n.13, 250.
89. Employee pension plans are subject, as the majority acknowledges, to § 401 of the
Internal Revenue Code. See 438 U.S. at 236. Moreover, as the Court noted, the United States
Congress had been considering a pension act that was similar to Minnesota's Pension Act. Id. at
248 n.21. Although these are not state measures, it is submitted that they nonetheless should
put an employer on notice that his pension plan may be subject to new regulations. Moreover,
since pension plans are but one aspect of labor-industrial relations-a highly regulated field-it
would seem that pension plans are an area in which regulation is to be anticipated. See id. at
261 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Pension Act operates in an area that is extensively
regulated- employee compensation).
90. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of this issue, see note 47 supra.
91. See note 12 supra.
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suggested that neither the text nor the documentary history of the contract
clause compelled Allied Structural Steel's expansive interpretation of "im-
pairment." Nor, it is submitted, was this expansive reading compelled by
precedent, since the only cases cited by the Court in support of its liberal
interpretation of "impairment" reflect the widely discredited juristic view of
the early twentieth century which applied a standard of strict scrutiny under
several constitutional provisions to protect private property from any legisla-
tive interference. 92
It is further suggested that the Court's attempt to justify its expansive
reading of "impairment" by logic borders on sophistry. The majority's re-
sponse to the dissent's conservative view that the clause should only apply to
laws diminishing contractual obligations was that "in any bilateral contract
the diminution of duties on one side effectively increases the duties on the
other." 9 3  It is submitted that this axiom simply misses the point because if
there had been a statutory diminution of duties, the existence of an impair-
ment would have been accepted by the dissent. 94 The problem in Allied
Structural Steel, however, was that there was an increase of duties on one
side which did not effectively diminish duties on the other. 95
92. The Allied Structural Steel Court had relied principally on two cases to support its
proposition that the imposition of an additional burden on a contracting party violated the con-
tract clause: Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U.S. 432 (1923), and Detroit United Ry.
v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 (1916). See 438 U.S. at 244-45 n.16. These cases were both decided
during the period directly following Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See notes 18-19
and accompanying text supra. Thus, the dissent noted that "[t]hese opinions reflect the then-
prevailing philosophy of economic due process which has since been repudiated." 438 U.S. at
259 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, under the majority's contract clause analysis, it is
submitted that even today the minimum wage laws in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,
298 U.S. 587 (1936), could be found unconstitutional, depending solely upon whether the Court
considers minimum wage laws to be reasonable and necessary. For a discussion of Morehead
and how its views became discredited in later years, see note 18 supra.
Moreover, it is suggested that the cases cited by the Court to exemplify the contract
clause's application to laws which increase contractual duties do not necessarily support the
Court's position because none of these cases actually held that the enlargement of obligations
constituted a proscribed impairment. See 438 U.S. at 244-45 n.16, citing Stockholders of
Peoples Banking Co. v. Sterling, 300 U.S. 175 (1937) (law increasing the liability of stockholders
does not impair the obligation of any contract); Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. South
Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 (1923) (act attempting to work a forfeiture of property found to impair a
contract); Nat'l Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co., 226 U.S. 276 (1912) (law altering
contractual remedy requirements of notice does not impair the obligation of contracts it affects);
Henley v. Myers, 215 U.S. 373 (1910) (law requiring new procedures for transferring stock does
not impair contracts); Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516 (1907) (statute enlarging enforce-
ment procedures for stockholder liability does not impair contracts); Sherman v. Smith, 66 U.S.
(1 Black) 587 (1861) (law making bank stockholders personally liable for debts of their bank does
not impair contracts).
93. 438 U.S. at 245 n.16.
94. The dissent reasoned that the contract clause did not apply because the Pension Act
merely imposed increased burdens on one contracting party without impairing any existing con-
tractual obligations. See id. at 251 (Brennan, J., dissenting); notes 60-61 and accompanying text
supra.
95. The Pension Act increased Allied's obligations by forcing it to pay a "pension funding
charge" that it would not have had to pay under the pension agreement. 438 U.S. at 236-39.
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The Court's indifference to the distinction between statutes which in-
crease, as opposed to diminish, contractual duties 96 is, it is suggested, in-
dicative of the Court's willingness to subordinate the technical meaning of con-
stitutional language to the goal of protecting contractual expectations from
any "unreasonable and unnecessary" interference by the democratic proc-
ess.97  The wisdom of applying such a policy both to laws which diminish
and to laws which increase contractual duties is questionable, however, since
an act which impairs an obligation affects the rights of an obligee in a fun-
damentally different way than an act which merely burdens a contracting
party with an additional duty. 98
Although the precedential value of Allied Structural Steel has not been
established, it is submitted that this decision could have a far-reaching im-
pact on state legislative programs. It is suggested that the intense judicial
scrutiny employed by the Court in examining the state's need for the Pen-
sion Act and its purpose in enacting that law is strong evidence that the
Court is once again willing to take an active stance in reviewing social and
economic legislation which affects private property in a constitutionally ques-
tionable manner, 99 A critical question raised by Allied Structural Steel is
whether intense scrutiny will be extended beyond those cases in which a
statute affecting property interests is challenged under the contract clause to
those in which a challenge is made under other constitutional provisions. 100
This increased obligation did not, however, diminish the employees' obligations; their duties
remained the same. See 438 U.S. at 238-39. The employer could receive all that his employees
promised, without any legal interference, if he would continue to allow his employees the op-
portunity to earn the pension credits he had offered them. Id. The only contractual right di-
minished was Allied's ability to terminate the pension plan without having to pay accumulated
pension credits to those employees who had worked for over a decade. Id. It is difficult to
conceive of this diminution of Allied's right as a lessening of the obligations owed to Allied by
its employees.
96. Compare the majority's summary treatment of this distinction, 438 U.S. at 244-45 n.16,
with the dissent's analysis of the same issue, id. at 251, 255-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the dissent's approach to this issue, see notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
97. The thrust of the majority's analysis seems to be that state laws cannot significantly alter
(i.e., increase or diminish) contractual obligations without having a sufficiently important need
and purpose demonstrated on the record. See notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
98. It is submitted that an obligee has a vested property right in a contractual obligation
owed to him, and that this vested right is lost when the obligation is impaired by the state.
However, there is no vested property right that is necessarily denied a contracting party by the
state's imposing duties upon him. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & St. Paul Ry. v. Paul, 173
U.S. 404 (1899) (law declaring when wages of terminated workers had to be paid held not to
violate due process clause).
99. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
100. Consider, for instance, the potential impact on constitutional law that would result if the
same level of scrutiny employed in Allied Structural Steel was applied in equal protection, due
process, and "taking" challenges to state regulatory measures that adversely affect property. See,
e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (equal protection clause does
not preclude city from prohibiting all advertising on trucks by anyone other than the truck's
owner); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (equal protection and due process do
not prohibit state from limiting who can fit and duplicate eye glass lenses to licensed optome-
trists and ophthalmologists); other cases cited note 70 supra. Arguably, these state laws could all
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Even if intense scrutiny is limited to contract clause cases, it is submit-
ted that Allied Structural Steel bases the validity of any state law which
might significantly upset contractual expectations on whether the judges
examining the statute subjectively approve of the substantive merits of the
legislature's objectives. 101 If the judiciary is permitted to decide whether
or not society actually needs the additional legal protection which the state
representatives have devised, it is submitted that courts will have the power
to effectively veto an enormous range of state legislation. 102
The theoretical hazards inherent in allowing the judiciary to decide is-
sues of conflicting economic interests under broad constitutional dictates, it
is submitted, are amply demonstrated by the Allied Structural Steel Court's
imaginative interpretation of fact and precedent which led to the demise of
the Pension Act. 103 The problems of this decision, however, go beyond the
Court's subjective treatment of the facts and its failure to defer evaluations of
the need for complicated social and economic programs to the democratic
organs of government. It is suggested that the Court in the present case, by
applying the contract clause to a law which merely increased contractual
obligations, struck down an act it had no authority even to consider under
that constitutional provision. 104
Craig R. Shagin
have been deemed unconstitutional had the Court applied the same intense scrutiny to them
which it utilized in Allied Structural Steel.
While it is perhaps too early to determine how the Court will address this problem, it
appears that the Court has not yet expanded its strict scrutiny of economic regulations beyond
cases involving contract clause challenges. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (law prohibiting landowner's use of valuable airspace valid under fifth
amendment), noted in 24 VILL. L. REv. 610 (1979). It should be noted, however, that three
Justices in Penn Central strongly dissented from the majority's holding. See 438 U.S. at 138
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. See 438 U.S. at 261 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the consequence of the Court's criteria is
to vest judges with the broad discretion to strike down laws which do not appeal to them); notes
65 & 70-72 and accompanying text supra.
102. Consider, for instance, the impact that Allied Structural Steel could have on statutes
requiring employers to provide their workers with greater medical care, higher minimum
wages, or longer work breaks, Consider also, the effect of the Court's analysis on social legisla-
tion requiring equal treatment of the sexes by insurance companies or other institutions which
rely on actuarial calculations. If such legislation can be said to upset the contractual expectations
of these companies, the act could be held unconstitutional. Another example would be legisla-
tion requiring the inclusion of normal pregnancies within employer disability plans. Arguably,
this also could be a violation of the contract clause. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(equal protection does not require inclusion of normal pregnancies in California employee disa-
bility plan).
103, See notes 73-89 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 90-98 and accompanying text supra.
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